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This issue of the Kybernetes journal is concerned with the philosophical question
- Can a Machine Think? Famously, in his 1950 paper ‘Computing Machinery and
Intelligence’ [9], the British mathematician Alan Turing suggested replacing this
question - which he found “too meaningless to deserve discussion” - with a simple
[behaviourial] test based on an imagined ‘Victorianesque’ pastime he entitled the
‘imitation game’. In this special issue of Kybernetes a selection of authors with
a special interest in Turing’s work (including those who participated in the 2008
AISB Turing Symposium1) have been invited to explore and clarify issues arising
from Turing’s 1950 paper on the Imitation Game; now more widely known as the
Turing test.
As early as 1941 Turing was thinking about machine intelligence [2] - specifically
how computing machines could solve problems by searching through the space of
possible problem solutions guided by heuristic principles. And in 1947 Turing gave
what is perhaps the earliest public lecture on machine intelligence at the Royal
Astronomical Society, London. Subsequently, in 1948, following a year’s sabbatical
at Cambridge, Turing completed a report for the UK’s National Physical Labora-
tory on his research into machine intelligence, entitled Intelligent Machinery [8].
Although not published contemporaneously, the report is notable for predicting
many core themes which eventually emerged from the yet nascent science of ma-
chine intelligence: Expert Systems; Connectionism; Evolutionary Algorithms; but
most intriguingly of all in the context of this special issue, the report offers per-
haps the earliest version of the imitation game / Turing test. Turing presents this
original version as follows:
“The extent to which we regard something as behaving in an intel-
ligent manner is determined as much by our own state of mind and
training as by the properties of the object under consideration. If
1To coincide with the Loebner Prize competition held at the University of Reading (UK)
on the 12th October 2008, the AISB elected to sponsor a one day ‘invited-speaker’ symposium
to present an alternative, formal, academic critique of issues around the Turing test. The day
commenced with talks from three eminent speakers (Baroness Greenfield; Michael Wheeler &
Selmer Bringsjord) who offered a personal context to, and their perspective on, the Turing
test. These presentations were followed in the afternoon session with the invitation to four
subsequent speakers (Andrew Hodges; Luciano Floridi; Margaret Boden; Owen Holland) to
address specific matters related to the Turing test (e.g. definitional; adequacy; tests in other
modalities; technical/computational issues). The day ended with a short round-table discussion
regarding some of the issues raised during the day
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we are able to explain and predict its behaviour or if there seems to
be little underlying plan, we have little temptation to imagine intel-
ligence. With the same object therefore it is possible that one man
would consider it as intelligent and another would not; the second
man would have found out the rules of its behaviour.
It is possible to do a little experiment on these lines, even at the
present stage of knowledge. It is not difficult to devise a paper
machine which will play a not very bad game of chess. Now get
three men as subjects for the experiment A, B, and C. A and C
are to be rather poor chess players, B is the operator who works the
paper machine. (ln order that he should be able to work it fairly fast
it is advisable that he be both mathematician and chess player.) Two
rooms are used with some arrangement for communicating moves,
and a game is played between C and either A or the paper machine.
C may find it quite difficult to tell which he is playing.
(This is a rather idealized form of an experiment I have actually
done.2)
Subsequently, in the initial exposition of the imitation game presented in the
1950 paper [9], Turing called for a human interrogator (C) to hold a conversation
with a male and female respondent (A and B) with whom the interrogator could
communicate only indirectly by typewritten text. The object of this game was for
the interrogator to correctly identify the gender of the players (A and B) purely
as a result of such textual interactions; what makes the task non-trivial is that
(a) the respondents are allowed to lie and (b) the interrogator is allowed to ask
questions ranging over the whole gamut of human experience. At first glance it is
perhaps mildly surprising that, even after many such textual interactions, a skilled
player can determine (more accurately than by chance) the correct gender of the
respondents.3
Turing then asked the question - What happens when a machine takes the part
of a respondent in this game? Would the interrogator decide wrongly as often as
when playing the initial imitation game? In this flavour of the imitation game /
Turing test - which has become known as the ‘standard interpretation’ - a suitably
2Some commentators (e.g.Whitby [1] and Shah & Warwick (herein)) have suggested that Tur-
ing didn’t intend the imitation game to be the specification of some fully operational procedure
to be performed by future machine intelligence researchers as a yardstick with which to evaluate
their wares, but merely as a thought experiment “attempting to deal with the ill-definition .. of
the question .. can machines think?” (Wiggins [12]). The fact that Turing personally enacted
this first version of the imitation game offers perhaps partial evidence against this thesis.
3Here Turing’s Victorianesque parlour game describes a scenario perhaps not unfamiliar to
that many twenty-first century video gamers encounter when participating in a large multi-user
virtual world - such as World of Warcraft or Second Life - where in-game avatars controlled by
real-world players may often fail to reflect the gender they claim to be; the controller may be
female and the avatar male or vice versa.
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programmed computer takes the part of either player (A) or player (B) (i.e. the
computer plays as either the man or the woman) and the interrogator (C) simply
has to determine which respondent is the human and which is the machine.
However, a close reading of the 1950 paper reveals several other possible in-
terpretations other than the standard version outlined above. For example it is
possible to interpret Turing when he says: “We now ask the question, ‘What will
happen when a machine takes the part of (A) in this game?’ Will the interrogator
decide wrongly as often when the game is played like this as he does when the
game is played between a man and a woman?” as meaning:
(a) literally what he says - that the computer must pretend to be a
woman, and the other participant in the game actually is a woman
(see Genova [4] and Traiger [7]);
(b) that the computer must pretend to be a woman, and the other
participant in the game is a man who must also pretend to be a
woman.
Although in a very literal sense, the above present valid alternative interpre-
tations of the imitation game, the core of Turing’s 1950 article (and material in
other articles that Turing wrote at around the same time) strongly support the
claim that Turing actually intended the standard interpretation4.
In the 1950 paper Turing confidently predicted that by the year 2000 there would
be computers with 1G of storage, (which turned out to be a relatively accurate
prediction), which would be able to perform the [standard] Turing test such that
the average interrogator would not have more than 70% chance of making the
right identification after five minutes of questioning; the latter claim being slightly
ambiguous :- did Turing intend the imitation game to be played out over five
minutes of questioning in total or did he mean five minutes of questioning per
respondent?
Furthermore, although Turing specifically describes playing the imitation game
with ‘average’ interrogators, some commentators - perhaps remembering Kas-
parov’s titanic series of games against chess playing machines - hint at a ‘strong’
version of the imitation game; where the interrogator is the best interrogator
mankind can offer, the game is played as an open ended conversation and the test
is for full ‘human indistinguishability’ (cf. Hugh Loebner’s specification for the
gold medal prize in his version of the Turing test5).
4See Copeland [3], Piccinini [6], and Moor [5].
5In 1990 Hugh Loebner agreed with ‘The Cambridge Center for Behavioural Studies’ to un-
derwrite a contest designed to implement a Turing-style test. Dr. Loebner pledged (i) a ‘Grand
Prize’ of $100,000 and a ‘solid 18 carat gold medal’ for the first computer program whose re-
sponses were indistinguishable from a human’s and (ii) an annual prize - $3,000 in 2010 - and
bronze medal to be awarded to the most human-like computer program (i.e. the best entry
relative to other entries that year, irrespective of how good it is in an absolute sense). A full
description of the 2008 competition by Huma Shah and Kevin Warwick is presented herein.
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In 2008 the organisers of the annual Loebner Bronze medal Prize elected to put
Turing’s 1950 prediction to the test in the first - least demanding - manner, by
enacting a set of five minute Turing tests for the bronze medal prize; specifically,
each interrogator was allowed a total of five minutes to respond to both entities
(the human and the computer). As a consequence the expected interaction time
with the computer program was just two and a half minutes. However, in 2008
even this minimal ‘five minute’ claim proved optimistic as Elbot - evaluated as
the best computer program in this competition - achieved a maximum deception
rate of 25% over two and a half minutes of interaction; still 5% short of the 30%
deception rate Turing had predicted in 1950.
Nonetheless it seems very likely that in the next few years Turing’s predictions
for a ‘time limited’ Turing test will be met; whether that means at that juncture
“general educated opinion will have altered so much that one will be able to speak
of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted” (as Turing asserted) is
very doubtful as, in the 50 plus years since the paper was first published, the status
of the Turing test as a definitive measure of machine intelligence and understanding
has been extensively critiqued6.
In 2008 the AISB sponsored an invited speaker Turing symposium at the Uni-
versity of Reading in the hope of eliciting further clarity in the interpretation of
the Turing test, further insight into its implications and further reflection as to its
status as a [practical] measure of machine intelligence7. However the breadth and
depth of the material presented in this special issue clearly illustrate that Turing’s
imitation game continues to present novel insights into mind and machine and any
hope for a ‘near final’ word on the imitation game remains as far off as ever. On
behalf of the AISB and Kybernetes, I would like to thank all the expert contrib-
utors to both the 2008 symposium and this volume for making time to address
these ever fascinating issues.
- Mark Bishop (Chair elect AISB and Professor of Cognitive Computing at
Goldsmiths, University of London), November 2009.
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